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King’s College London
There is much disagreement about how extensive a role theoretical mind-
reading, behavior-reading, and simulation each have and need to have in
our knowing and understanding other minds, and how each method is im-
plemented in the brain, but less discussion of the epistemological question
what it is about the products of these methods that makes them count as
knowledge or understanding. This question has become especially salient
recently as some have the intuition that mirror neurons can bring under-
standing of another’s action despite involving no higher-order processing,
whereas most epistemologists writing about understanding think that it re-
quires reflective access to one’s grounds, which is closer to the intuitions
of other commenters on mirror neurons. I offer a definition of what it is
that makes something understanding that is compelling independently of
the context of cognition of other minds, and use it to show two things: 1)
that theoretical mind-reading and simulation bring understanding in virtue
of the same epistemic feature, and 2) why the kind of motor representation
without propositional attitudes that is done by mirror neurons is sufficient
for action understanding. I further suggest that more attention should be
paid to the potential disadvantages of a simulative method of knowing.
Though it can be more efficient in some cases, it can also bring vulnerabil-
ity, wear and tear on one’s personal equipment, and unintended mimicry.
Introduction
The view that we know the beliefs, desires, intentions, and feelings of
other people by, in some sense, simulating or replicating them has been
around for a long time, but in cognitive science in the 1980s it began to be
developed more fully as a rival to the view that we know each other’s mental
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states by interpreting them using concepts and theories. There are many
versions of this simulation view of our mindreading capacities, but broadly
speaking on such a view we know each other’s minds primarily by running
through a similar process in our own mental equipment to what is going on in
theirs, and seeing what mental states and behavior we ourselves would have.
On a theoretical mind-reading view, we know each other’s minds primarily
by having beliefs about others’ behavior and mental states to which we apply
a theory of mind and reason to conclusions about other mental states and
behavior.1 It is clear that we are capable of theoretical mind-reading, but the
plausibility of our at least sometimes also simulating was secured with the
discovery of mirror neurons at the end of the 20th century. This phenomenon
gives concrete evidence that in some cases we actually do acquire a kind of
replica of the other person’s mental states in our own mental states, and that
we do this not only in imagination but at the level of our brains, in body-
coded patterns of firings of the same neurons that fire when we do or feel the
thing we witness the other doing, a phenomenon called embodied simulation
(Gallese and Goldman 1998, Gallese, Keysers, and Rizzolati 2004, Gallese
and Sinigaglia 2011, Goldman 2012, Casile 2013).
This firing of motor neurons is the simulative response that stands
in the most extreme contrast to a theoretical response, since motor neu-
rons definitely do not carry out reflection and their firings are not believ-
ings or other kinds of propositional attitudes using concepts. This leads
to the question just how much understanding can be achieved through
them alone. If we get something epistemic out of matching that is this
devoid of thought then simulation is powerful indeed, but how could it
be so?
Mirror neurons display three properties that I take to be required for
simulation in this context (Cf. Goldman 2006). One is that a simulation
executes a process, another that the process is dynamically isomorphic to
the process undergone by the person being evaluated, hereafter the actor,
and third that the process is a re-deployment of the mechanism that serves
the mind-reader when she herself behaves along the dimensions relevant to
the behavior of the actor. I will argue that the first two features, which are
shared by theoretical mindreading, are what makes either method able to
deliver understanding. The qualitative nature of the dynamically isomorphic
states the understander possesses—whether beliefs or primitive firings—and
whether the process is a redeployment or not are what I take to distinguish
simulation from theory. These features are not per se relevant to whether or
how much understanding is delivered, but they are pragmatically relevant
to how efficiently and accurately understanding is achieved in a given case,
and with how much risk to the mind-reader. As I will explain below, the
simulator may think less and respond faster with the same accuracy in some
kinds of cases, but he also has “skin in the game” and this can carry costs
that the theorizer avoids.
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Social Cognition as Knowledge
Many think of simulation as a process, one that takes “pretend” behavior
and mental states as input and by grinding these inputs through a person’s
own belief-desire mill, produces “pretend” mental states and behavior as out-
put, output that is then projected onto the mind one is trying to understand
(Goldman 2006). As a process, simulation lends itself well to the application
of Alvin Goldman’s epistemological theory of justified belief as a belief that
resulted from a reliable process, that is, a process that produces true beliefs
most of the time. Simulation can be a way of gaining such justified beliefs
about other minds on the assumption that human beings’ belief-desire mills
are similar to each other, despite wide variation in the beliefs and desires
themselves. If our mills are similar enough, and I put relevantly similar be-
liefs, desires, and intentions as input into my mill as are input in yours, then
I will usually come up with accurate beliefs about your beliefs, desires, inten-
tions and behavior. If this process does get it right most of the time then that
means, on Goldman’s view, that each one of its verdicts is a justified belief.
Reasoning with a theory, and inferring from past to future behavior in
more primitive ways by association, are also processes, and Goldman’s view
of justified belief applies in the same way to them. Insofar as the theoretical
assumptions we make about other minds are true, and we accurately observe
other minds’ behavior, infer their mental states from it, and appropriately
apply the theoretical assumptions to it, the beliefs that we get about their
future mental states and behavior will also be accurate. That in this way
we get it right most of the time means that every occasion of it yields a
justified belief. Goldman’s concept of justified belief applies in a similar
way to less intellectually developed or consciously available processes of
predicting behavior on the basis of other behavior. It does not matter how
unsophisticated the process might be or how inaccessible its workings might
be to the subject herself, as long as it gives her true beliefs most of the time.
Justified belief is the main ingredient of knowledge on Goldman’s view2
so despite the differences in the three processes that could be methods of
knowing other minds, the methods all would produce knowledge of other
minds in virtue of the same property: the reliability of the process through
which those beliefs were formed.
Many theories of knowledge will apply neatly to simulations and other
forms of mind-reading even though they do not take the process through
which a belief was formed to be the crucial bearer of epistemically relevant
properties. A more traditional view of justified belief, and thereby knowledge,
has an internalist requirement that the subject have access to the reasons for
his belief, and be able to give an account of those reasons, and this is a con-
dition that theorizing about other minds can easily achieve. This is because
that reasoning is usually imagined to take place via meta-beliefs about the
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other mind and minds in general, and these will usually be accessible to the
subject, at least in principle.3
But this traditional view will not count all simulations as giving justified
belief. If a simulation is of the high-level variety where one uses imagination
to stage the play that results in a conclusion about the other mind, then one
will often be able to give some account of why one believes that conclusion,
and by that fact have a justified belief. However embodied simulation does
not use imagination4—the replicas of the other mind’s states are coded more
primitively in the firings of mirror neurons—and a subject whose conclusion
about the other person has been affected by these neurons may not be able
to give informative reasons why he has the conclusion he has. If we think
that embodied simulation can give a subject beliefs with the same level of
justification as beliefs reasoned from a good theory can have, then Goldman’s
view of justified belief, which is externalist since it does not require the subject
to be able to call up the reasons for his belief, has an advantage over the
traditional view of justified belief and knowledge.
There are other externalist theories of knowledge that can be applied
easily to our mentalizing beliefs about other people. My own favorite view
takes the properties relevant to the epistemic achievement of knowledge
to be two tracking requirements (Roush 2005). The first is the variation
or sensitivity condition, which says that in order for the subject to know
proposition p her dispositions must be such that the probability she does not
believe p given that p is false is high (or, equivalently, the probability that
she believes it given that it is false is low):
P(−b(p)/−p) > .95 variation (sensitivity) condition
The second is the adherence condition, which says that the probability
she believes p given that p is true is high:
P(b(p)/p) > .95 adherence
These conditional probabilities are modal properties. In order for the subject
to satisfy them in a particular case of belief she must have dispositions that
would make her have the same belief or non-belief responses to the truth and
falsity of p in a variety of non-actual situations.5 On this picture knowledge
of p is a matter of being disposed to have one’s belief states follow p through
changes in circumstances and p’s truth value.
The application of the tracking conditions to mentalizing about other
minds is straightforward. If a subject has dispositions of using a theory and
observations about others’ behavior and states in such a way as to avoid false
ascriptions of mental state m to others and to tend to make true attributions
of mental state m, then in any particular case of attributing m she tracks
that mental state, and if in addition she is actually right in that case then she
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also knows.6 If her more primitive behavior-predicting mechanisms track
behavior in a similar way, and so yield beliefs about the other that track
the other, then she knows for similar reasons. The criteria are the same for
simulations. If via simulation a subject truly believes that another has mental
state m and the subject’s simulative powers and tendencies are such that were
the mental state not there in the other mind she wouldn’t believe it was, and
were that to be the mental state in a range of other situations she would
also believe it was7, then that belief about the other is knowledge. Tracking
can also be defined for states more primitive than belief, by substituting
some other state in for b(p) in the equations. A person will track where the
actor’s hand is if her mirror neurons fire selectively, that is, fire in a certain
pattern when the hand is in a given state, and do not fire when it is not in
that state. Whether the subject uses a theory of mind, simulation, high-level
or low-level, or primitive behavior-predicting heuristics, the results will be
knowledge or knowledge-like, if they are, in virtue of the same property:
fulfillment of the tracking conditions.
However we come to a belief, in order for it to count as knowledge it
must have a robustness by its accuracy being more than an accident. Whereas
that is guaranteed in Goldman’s view by the requirement that your process
get it right most of the time, and in an internalist justified-belief view by the
fact that you can give good reasons for your belief, in tracking it is insured by
your disposition to get a belief state about p that is appropriately responsive
to p’s truth value in all probable non-actual circumstances.8
On this tracking view it does not matter whether simulation or theorizing
is the process one uses because what method or process you use to come to
your beliefs does not matter at all per se to whether a belief counts as
knowledge. It matters only insofar as the method and your tendency to use
that method affect your tendency to come to an appropriate belief state.
Similar to Goldman’s view the tracking view is also externalist: it does not
matter whether under questioning you could come up with any reason at all
for your belief. What matters here is whether your belief actually stands in a
tracking relation to the truth. Thus according to the tracking view embodied
simulation is at no epistemic disadvantage if one who uses it is unable to give
an account of how he came to his conclusion about the other person.
The tracking view is consistent with the plain fact that the process or
method used matters pragmatically insofar as given the creatures we are some
methods will be available and effective while others will not. For example,
if there is no fairy godmother in our world then we might need to use
perception, or, due to the limits of our automatic inferences in complex cases
we might need to use explicit reasoning, which we would also be able to
report on questioning. But these are contingent facts about the means to
knowledge, not relevant, on the tracking view, to the question what it is to
achieve the goal of knowledge.
356 Sherrilyn Roush
These reflections make the simple point that on a variety of views of
knowledge behavior-reading, simulation, and theoretical mind-reading are
capable of delivering knowledge of other minds, and though each theory of
knowledge sees a different feature as crucial to whether a belief is knowledge,
for a given theory its key feature applies naturally to all three methods of
social cognition; the reasons the methods give knowledge when they do are
the same within each view. The one wrinkle in this neat story is that internalist
views of justified belief or knowledge may have difficulty finding a way to
count the deliverances of embodied simulation as knowledge. However, that
will depend on the details of the particular epistemological theory and the
detailed facts of embodied simulation.
Knowledge versus Understanding
Though the terms “knowledge” and “understanding” are sometimes
used synonymously, the word “understanding” as applied to persons has
warm, fuzzy, and respectful connotations that are prima facie not well-
captured by the idea of accurate identification and prediction of behavior
and mental states, even if we add that one must achieve this accuracy ro-
bustly. The general concept of understanding as distinct from knowledge has
received a great deal of attention in recent epistemology (e.g., Kvanvig 2003,
Elgin 2006, 2009), and several features stand out as consensus views among
those who theorize about what it is to understand a subject matter. One is
that understanding requires appreciation of the relations among the facts
in that domain, another that one who understands must be able to use her
beliefs in further inferences about or activities concerning the subject matter,
still another that understanding is more valuable than and not a subspecies
of knowledge. These would not be implausible as requirements on what it
is to understand another person’s action or desire, but notice that none of
the views of knowledge above explicitly imply that one will have any of
these properties with regard to a person whose mental state one knows or a
proposition that one knows about them. Understanding is a different epis-
temic property from knowledge, and can be expected to be so in application
to persons as much as to subject matters.
The only explicit definition of understanding that I know of in terms
of necessary and sufficient conditions is my own view based on relevance
matching (Roush forthcoming) which I will use to explore the similarities
and differences among the methods of mentalizing about other minds. This
is a view not of what it is to understand a subject matter, which occupies most
epistemologists in this area, but what it is to understand why p, a proposition,
is true, as opposed to merely knowing that it is true. The contrast is easily
seen by thinking of cases of knowledge got by using mere indicators. I can
know what the temperature is outside by using a good thermometer, but that
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would not give me an understanding of why the temperature is what it is.
For that I would need to appeal to things like what season it is, and that a
cold front has just come in to my area. A better understanding would come
from wider and deeper knowledge of the detailed dynamics of snowstorms,
world weather and climate at the current time, and general meteorology.
The relevance matching view of understanding takes its cue from the idea
that understanding why p is true requires an appreciation of the relation of
p’s being true or false to other matters being true or false. Like the tracking
view of knowledge it makes the idea rigorous in terms of a particular kind
of dispositional covariation of properties of one’s belief in p with properties
of the world, expressed in conditional probability, and in which the direction
of fit has the subject following the world. Unlike in tracking, the relevant
matters in the world that one’s belief must by definition be well-disposed
toward include not just p but many other propositions. All understanding
that finite human beings actually achieve will be partial on this view, but this
is not counterintuitive.
Any proposition, q, has a degree of relevance to p that is, intuitively, the
difference that q’s being true or false makes to p’s being true or false, and
that degree of relevance might of course be none. q’s being positively relevant
to p can be expressed in probability as follows:
P (p/q) > P(p/−q)
This says that, other things equal, p is more likely when q is true than when
q is false—q’s being true rather than false makes a positive difference to
whether p is true—and the further the left hand side exceeds the right hand
side the more the positive relevance. We can measure how much difference
it makes by considering the ratio of the two terms, where positive relevance
means P(p/q)|P(p/−q) > 1, and I will take how far this value is greater than
1 to measure the degree of positive relevance.9 If q is not relevant to p the
greater-than signs are replaced by equals signs. If q is negatively relevant to
p, then not-q will be positively relevant.
A distinct question is whether q’s being true or false makes a difference
to your believing p. If q’s truth makes a positive difference to whether you
believe p, that is, to b(p), we can express that situation as follows:
P(b(p)/q) > P(b(p)/−q)
You are more likely to believe p given that q is true than you are given that
q is false. q’s truth value is something you rely on in opting to believe or
not believe p. This can also be written as the ratio of those two terms being
greater than 1:
P(b(p)/q)|P(b(p)/−q) > 1
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and measured by how far it exceeds 1. Again if q is irrelevant to your believing
p then these greater-than signs will be replaced by equals signs, and when q
is negatively relevant not-q will be positively relevant.
If you are to appreciate the relations p has to other matters then the
relevance that the truth values of propositions other than p have to your
believing p had better match, to some degree, the relevance that they have to
p’s being true. I will call it a relevance match for p on q when
P(b(p)/q) |P(b(p)/−q) ≈ P(p/q)|P(p/−q)
the difference that q makes to whether you believe p (the term on the left hand
side) is approximately the same as the difference that q makes to whether p
is the case (the right hand side). We have a relevance mismatch for p on q
whenever
P(b(p)/q)|P(b(p)/−q) ≈ P(p/q)|P(p/−q)
that is, when q’s truth value makes significantly more of a difference or less
of a difference to whether you believe p—the left-hand side—than it does
to whether p is true—the right-hand side. Understanding why p is true then
requires that you relevance match for p on an appropriate domain of q’s.
For the case of temperature, reading the thermometer would give you little
understanding of why the temperature is low if you would believe it is low
regardless of whether a cold front is or is not coming in and of whether you
do or do not live near the equator, since the temperature depends on those
things.
Pictorially, the relevance matching conditions require the following kind
of relation of your dispositions to believe p and p’s relations to other matters:
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The arrow from ±p to ±b(p) indicates that your belief in p tracks p, where
the ± indicates the two possibilities for the truth values of the proposition;
tracking has you following the world and not the other way around, so the
arrow is single-sided. The arrows between the qis and your belief in p indicate
the relevance matching by being isomorphic to the arrows between the qis
and p.
While this picture is good as far as it goes, it does not capture a no-
tion of understanding that goes beyond tracking, for perfect tracking—the
relation in the diagram between p and b(p)—logically implies perfect rele-
vance matching, and vice versa. This is because a perfect indicator does your
relevance matching for you. A perfect thermometer perfectly follows the tem-
perature, and so follows the existence or not of a cold front in precisely the
way that that temperature does. In perfectly following the thermometer your
belief about the temperature follows the cold front in the only way you need
to do for relevance matching.
Imperfect relevance matching and imperfect tracking diverge in ways
that are important pragmatically to how best to go about pursuing either
of them (Roush forthcoming). However they do not differ in the right way
to make imperfect relevance matching into imperfect understanding, since
any degree of mere matching of your believing p to the factors in p’s web of
relevance is still compatible with the matching being secured by something
other than yourself. You may do imperfect but good relevance matching
to the factors relevant to a storm via an imperfect but good thermometer.
Or you might consult what a good computer simulation programmed by
someone else concludes about the likely course of a storm, and to be good
it must make use of many factors relevant to the storm. Your belief about
the course of the storm will relevance match to those factors because the
simulation does, but if you have no clue or sense of how the simulation gets its
conclusions then this gives you no understanding of why the storm will follow
that path.
This inadequacy of mere relevance matching corresponds to the observa-
tion of several authors, noted above, that understanding is something that its
possessor can use in further inferences or activities. Relevance matching is a
direct way of expressing sensitivity to the factors in p’s web of relevance and
is part of understanding on my view, but the subject can achieve it without
being able to take the understanding home with her and leave the computer
at work, without herself having a capacity to know how to go on or exploit
the relevance matching in her further endeavors. The additional condition
besides relevance matching that is needed for a subject to understand why p
is true, as I have argued elsewhere (Roush forthcoming), is that the subject
herself possess states whose dispositional relations to her belief in p match
the dispositional relations that the qi’s have to p, a situation that can be
depicted as follows:
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The subject who possesses the network of four states in the right half of the
diagram not only has a belief-state with regard to p that is dispositionally
related to the qi’s in the same ways that p is related to those qi’s but also has
states si that her believing p or not is dispositionally related to in the same
ways as p is related to the qi’s. For example, if p’s truth is positively relevant
to q3’s falsehood to some degree, then the subject’s belief in p is positively
relevant to state s3 being in the off mode to a similar degree. And so on for
all of the possible permutations. For ease of exposition I have represented the
possibilities as binaries—true or false, plus or minus, on or off—but naturally
they could come in degrees.
The subject in the next figure relevance matches to p on q1, q2, and q3
(omitted for simplicity) as in the previous diagram, but this figure displays
that having si’s with the property just explained gives the subject a dynamical
model of the web of relevance around p, because the subject’s si states track
the qi’s. This is because it follows logically from her states, ±si, relating to
her belief state ±b(p) in the same way as the ±qi relate to ±p, and her belief
b(p) tracking p, that her states si
have a minimum level of tracking of the qi respectively.10
In cases fitting these latest two diagrams, the subject has a set of states
that is isomorphic to p and its web of relevance, which I call a dynamical
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mirror model because the replica is not a static image but fully dispositional.
The si’s do not just happen to coincide at a given time with b(p) in a way that
mirrors the qi’s relations with p. The covariation of their values, indicated by
+ or −, with the subject’s believing p or not co-varies with the covariation
of the qi’s’ values with p’s truth or falsity in all relevant possible worlds.
Understanding why p is true is not itself a propositional attitude toward
p but a co-variation of co-variations of states of the world and states of the
understander. To understand why p is true is to own a dynamical working
model of p’s web of relevance, not in one’s pocket but somewhere in one’s
person.11 Owning that model implies that in any particular actual state of the
world you very likely actually have the appropriate mirror states, whether that
means “off” or “on” corresponding to true and false for p and each of the
qi. As above with tracking, what it might take to bring it about that you have
this set of interacting dispositions, or to activate them in a particular way,
is not relevant to whether the set of dispositions counts as understanding,
a point that will be important in application to the case of mirror neurons
below.
I do not require that the states si in one’s model are themselves beliefs
or even mental states more generally, because, on theoretical and intuitive
grounds, I do not think understanding requires these. Theoretically, it is
evident from the diagrams, I think, that what does the work of giving a
subject appreciation of the relation of p to other matters is not the qualitative
properties of the si, but the relations of the si’s to other states of the subject,
especially b(p), and the relation of these to the qi’s and p. It is appreciation
of the relations that other matters have to whether p is true, the relevance
matching, not the qualitative properties of the states one does relevance
matching with, that makes it count as understanding. It is clear from the
definitions that understanding is strictly stronger than tracking, and hence
more than knowledge. And the fact that understanding resides in the relation
of one’s dispositional states to a network of other matters means that even
when one’s understanding is carried by states more primitive than belief,
that’s counting as understanding is not due to understanding’s having been
watered down to predictive success about p.
Intuitively, we can see why understanding does often involve but does
not require beliefs about the q by thinking about examples. In a well-worn
example from discussion of scientific explanation, we improve our under-
standing of why p, Mr. J has paresis, a distinctive kind of paralysis, when
we discover that only people with tertiary, untreated syphilis have this con-
dition. This is borne out by my picture because the discovery means that
our belief or lack of belief that someone has paresis now covaries appro-
priately not only with beliefs about his paralysis symptoms but with belief
or lack of belief in another factor, the presence of latent untreated syphilis,
so this counts as an improvement in our understanding of Mr. J’s having
the paralysis. This is a case where the appreciation of relevance relations
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is carried by beliefs: that a patient has untreated syphilis, and that this
is a necessary condition for paresis, are things one acquires beliefs about.
Explicit reasoning about Mr. J would display one’s understanding. Reason-
ing from a belief that latent untreated syphilis is a necessary condition for
paresis to the belief that the patient has latent untreated syphilis would ex-
hibit that one has beliefs whose dispositions to be held or not correspond to
the logical and probabilistic relations that the beliefs’ propositional contents
have in the world. In other words, the si’s in this case are beliefs in the
qi’s; si is b(qi).
However, the appreciation of relevance relations around p may be carried
by states that a person does not have reflective access to and that may
not have the compositional complexity of belief. We have this in cases of
expert intuition, for example when, as the story goes, Linus Pauling, on
learning of the sickled appearance of the blood cells in sickle-cell anemia,
immediately declared that this must be due to a genetic abnormality in the
hemoglobin molecule. It took years of dogged work (by Harvey Itano) to
discover what the chemical abnormality is that causes the sickling, but it was
considered worth the investigation because everyone knew that Pauling’s vast
experience of molecular chemistry gave him understanding—appreciation of
the extent and types of relevance of chemical properties to phenomena at a
larger scale—that supported the plausibility of his specific conjectures. He
appreciated relevance relations beyond what he would probably have been
able to say explicitly at the time.
Understanding without the ability to report beliefs or give explicit ex-
planations is common in science (Lipton 2009). Visual imagination and a
good orrery can give one understanding of the retrograde motion of Mer-
cury that one might not be able to give an equivalent verbal account of. One
can acquire sophisticated understanding of a machine by becoming expert at
using it, and this manipulational ability stores causal information that one
may not be able to articulate in sentences. The inarticulateness, which on
my model is due to the states si being something more primitive than belief,
does not prevent understanding from being usable. One who understands
Mercury’s motion via the orrery would be able in the same way to see what
change in its position or motion would iron out the retrograde appearance.
One who understands the machine via manipulation will know how to use
it on a new case. Pauling’s understanding gave him hunches about which
specific properties to check. Understanding is often used to make inferences
from some beliefs to others, but it need not be carried by beliefs in order to
be usable.
Social Cognition and Understanding
The two main models of the way that we cognize other minds, simula-
tion and theoretical mindreading, can both be seen as capable of delivering
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understanding on this view. Both simulation and reasoning are processes,
and, speaking abstractly, they are each an activation of a complex of disposi-
tions that lies in wait in the understander. In the case of reasoning these are
dispositions to change one belief in response to changes in another belief. For
a very basic example, a good reasoner will be disposed to believe p whenever
he believes p-and-q, and will be disposed to withdraw belief in p-and-q when
he comes to believe not-q.12 For deductive relations among propositions the
dispositional relations among his beliefs can mirror those relations in the
world without him having done empirical investigation. When his beliefs and
the dispositional relations among them are graded, degree of belief in p being
disposed merely to increase degree of belief in q for example, those relations
among his degrees of belief will mirror the relations among the propositions,
such as p and q, when he has it right about how the matters of p and q relate
in the world.
Suppose one knows that actor A is wealthy, with much more in resources
than he can use himself. In conversation with A one forms the belief that A
is sympathetic to the plight of B, and one encourages A to help B financially.
One knows that B is proud, so there is some likelihood he will reject the
help, but there is a decent chance he will accept it although that would also
bring him ambivalence and resentment. But you feel sure A will not tell B
that you encouraged him because A will want to be seen as coming to the
idea himself. Thus you think that your encouragement of A will increase the
chances that he offers help to B, and not be revealed to B, and that in this
way you can raise the chances of B getting help without B’s resenting you or
being embarrassed for it in front of you.
In this case reasoning with a theory of mind gives a plausible model of
your cognition of A’s and B’s actions and mental states. You have beliefs
about how pride affects acceptance of help and inclination to reveal the
causes of one’s actions, as well as the mental states of ambivalence and
resentment and embarrassment, and about the characteristics of A and B in
particular in these dimensions. These beliefs are premises in your reasoning,
and they are also si in the model of understanding. You can understand to
some extent why A offers help, if he does, or why B accepts it, if he does,
because you have beliefs about these qi and their relevance to, their potential
to affect, A and B’s behavior, and your beliefs about the qi are disposed to
change relative to each other and to your belief in p, say the proposition that
B accepts the offer with ambivalence, in the same way as the qis are disposed
to change relative to each other and to p. Moreover, you would be able
to call up at least a sketchy version of these beliefs and their relationships
on questioning. Thus, the dynamical mirroring model of understanding can
easily count theoretical mindreading as showing understanding.13
A simulation also activates a dynamical mirror model, a web of disposi-
tional relationships among the understander’s mental states, but in this case
instead of reasoning, inferring from belief to belief about pride and offers
of help, one redeploys one’s own affective and motivational machinery. One
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settles in to an offline version of the feeling of pride, for example, pretends
that one needs help and that someone offers it, and then notes the offline
emotional reactions one has. If one’s own emotional equipment is relevantly
similar to that of the actor, and one has donned the appropriate offline be-
liefs and emotions to mirror his, then the outcome offline emotional reaction
will to a good extent match the reaction of the actor. Some of the si are
(offline) beliefs in this case, b(qi), such as that one has been offered help, but
others are emotional states, mi. We certainly possess concepts of pride and
embarrassment, but that alone does not imply that we always use them as
concepts, in beliefs, to come to our conclusions, even when they are relevant.
Action Understanding and Mirror Neurons
Some of the motor neurons that fire in a monkey when he grasps for an
object with his hand also fire when he sees someone else’s hand grasping for
an object in a similar way, though his mirroring neurons are not inducing the
same action on his part. Similar phenomena of reuse or redeployment have
been found in humans, and over a wider range of mental states including
not only action intentions but sensations and emotions (Gallese et al. 2004,
Keysers and Gazzola 2009, Rizzolatti and Craighero 2004, Casile 2013). One
dominant interpretation of the phenomenon is as a distinctively embodied
type of simulation, where what makes the firing of motor mirror neurons
embodied is that the information is formatted in bodily rather than proposi-
tional form (Goldman and Vignemont 2009), and the possible patterns are
constrained by dynamical possibilities of physical movements of the body.
The mirror neurons for, e.g., grasping objects have remarkable selectivity
to the goals of the witnessed action. In many cases the monkey’s neurons
that fire when he witnesses a genuine action do not fire for mimicry, where
the observed hand grasps just as if to pick up an apple but the monkey
knows no apple is there. When the grasping does have a goal, some mirror
neurons fire differentially for different goals. These can also fire selectively at
different stages of the action, at the beginning or later, in a way that shows
responsiveness to the level of abstraction of the goal (Casile 2013). Some
mirror neurons selectively respond to the goal independently of the proximal
means used to achieve it, whether by hand, foot or mouth, or by a variety
of different tools (Sinigaglia 2013).
As more evidence accumulates about how this process works, much
controversy surrounds what precise role this kind of simulative firing plays
in social cognition. In the understanding of motor action in particular, the
chief question has been what role the mirroring plays in understanding the
goal of an observed action. Two points of disagreement have been prominent
in the discussion. One is whether the mirror neuron firings are sufficient for
identification of the goal of an action. Some think the goal is identified by
Simulation and Understanding Other Minds 365
the mirror neurons via a direct matching (Rizzolatti et al. 2001, Gallese 2006,
Gallese and Sinigaglia 2011), while others think the evidence points to a
higher-order process that first identifies the goal and tells the mirror neurons
to model the observed action as having that goal rather than another by
firing selectively in the pattern corresponding to that goal (Csibra 2013,
Jacob 2013). A second prominent point of disagreement is around whether
mirror neurons firing in the pattern that corresponds to a particular goal
counts as ascription of that goal to the actor.
Both of these issues are taken to be crucial to whether mirror neurons can
deliver understanding all by themselves. I will take issue with this and argue
that which level of processing identifies the action as having one goal rather
than another, and whether matching firing by itself counts as ascription of a
goal, do not matter to whether the selective firing of mirror neurons counts
as understanding why a hand moves as it does. I will argue for these things
by showing that according to the independently sensible view given above of
what it is to understand why p is the case, the mere selective firing of mirror
neurons counts all by itself as understanding why a hand moves as it does.
There is also a kind of understanding of why the hand moves as it does that
is not captured by identifying which goal the actor has or ascribing that goal
rather than another to the actor. This is appreciation of the goal that it is
a goal rather than just a likely future event that makes some intermediate
events more likely than others, and this kind of understanding the matching
mirroring delivers directly. Overall, with my definition we can capture what
Rizzolatti, Gallese, Sinigaglia, and others are seeing in the mirror neuron
phenomenon, without running afoul of some of the objections that have
been made to their particular points.
Csibra (2013) and Jacob (2013) both argue that direct matching is not
sufficient to identify which goal an actor has in moving his hand in the
observed way. Their point can be illustrated through an interpretation of
the experiments showing mirror neurons’ selective behavior in response to
mimicry, not firing when the monkey knows that there is no apple the ob-
served hand can get to. The only observed feature that could tell the monkey
that the motion is mimicry is the contextual cue of presence or absence of
an apple, but the mirror neurons cannot themselves be processing that cue
since all that they can do is fire, or not fire, in a pattern that mirrors the
firing of the motor neurons making the hand move. Some other process, this
view says, must interpret the scene using the indicator of the presence or
absence of the apple, to tell the mirror neurons whether to fire in the grasp-
ing way or not. As Csibra says, “ . . . such interpretation [of goals] precedes
rather than follows from action mirroring” and “goal understanding is not
the output but the input of the mirroring process” (Csibra 2013, 450, 446,
respectively).
However this may be, it does not matter to whether the mirroring by
itself counts as understanding why the hand is moving as it does. This is
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because the mirroring by itself counts as a dynamical mirror model of the
action in the sense above, regardless of what further things cause the neurons’
activation or the selectivity of their response. Take the p in the diagram below
to be the proposition that the hand moves thus and so. Some of the qi relevant
to whether the hand moves thus and so will be propositions concerning the
actor’s relevant motor neurons firing. The subject who observes the hand
moving thus and so takes it to move so, that is, b(p), and that belief is related
to his own corresponding motor neuron firings, si, in the same way as the
actor’s hand moving, p, is related to the firings of his motor neurons, qi.
The subject thus possesses understanding of why p is the case, and this is in
virtue of actually mirroring and possessing the selective tendencies required
to fire the relevant neurons when the action is observed, and not when it
is not. Rizzolatti et al. put it simply in introducing their direct matching
hypothesis: “ . . . we understand an action because the motor representation
of that action is activated in our brain”.
The understanding delivered by the mirror neurons alone is incomplete of
course. There will usually be other relevant matters that one could come to
have states covarying with, e.g., further goals, such as eating the apple after
picking it up, that this particular mirroring set of neurons is not matching
to, but to which the subject could relevance match via some sort of state if
further clues about the action were forthcoming. But all understanding is
incomplete and can be filled out further by acquiring states that are disposed
to covary with more states of the world probabilistically relevant to whether
p occurs.
In the case of the moving hand, if there is a process separate from mirror
neurons that does the job of identifying which goal the actor has, then if that
node also corresponds to some state in the actor that is related to his moving
his hand, such as the intention to do this rather than that, then the observer’s
having that identifying process gives him greater understanding of why the
hand moves that way than he had without it. It is just that having that further
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node is not required in order to have understanding at all of why the hand
moves as it does. This is so even though on the assumption that there is a
separate process identifying the goal, that process is causally responsible for
activating the mirror neurons’ dispositions in one way rather than another.
As drawn out above, what it might take to bring it about that you have a
given set of interacting dispositions, or to activate them in a particular way,
is not relevant to whether that set of dispositions and activations counts as
understanding.
Nor, on my view, is ascription of the goal required for understanding
why the hand moves as it does. With Jacob (2013) and others, I take
ascription in the full-bodied sense that I think is natural, which is that “to
ascribe an intention to another is to judge or believe that they intend so
and so” (Jacob 2013, 1139). So, like these authors, I would not classify the
selective firing of mirror neurons as ascription of a goal or intention. But
both those in the discussion who think mirror neurons’ firing does count
as ascription (e.g. Gallese) and those who think it does not (e.g., Jacob), are
assuming that ascription of a goal or intention is needed for understanding
of an action, and this is where I disagree.
This is for two reasons. First, to suppose that goal ascription—
understood as some further thing beyond mirroring itself—is necessary for
understanding why a hand moves as it does is to make the same mistake as
we saw above with assuming that the cause of the activation of the mirroring
must be included in order to count the mirroring as understanding. Second,
to suppose that ascription in the full sense involving belief is required
for understanding is equivalent in my terms to supposing that in order
to understand why p is the case the states si that the observer has that
correspond to and covary with the qi that are relevant to p must be beliefs
about the qi—e.g. a belief that the actor intends to have the apple—whereas
I have argued above that those states need not even be mental.
We see this with someone whose understanding of a machine, that gives
him an ability to use it, is carried by muscle memory from his experience
of using it. The understanding is carried by the covariation of covariations,
whatever the qualitative nature of the states that carry it. In the case of the
hand, there is evidence that the neurons’ mirroring allows the observer to
predict or anticipate the future steps of the movement, and the outcome,
e.g., of acquiring the apple. If those anticipations are reliable then the
observers’ states are covarying with future states of the hand, and even if
the states that subserve those anticipations are not beliefs, but information
in bodily format, the covariation relationships they carry count as part of
the understanding. There is no need to count the mirroring as ascription of
a goal in order for it to qualify as understanding.
There is a further kind of understanding of the action that mirror neu-
rons can achieve all by themselves and that it may be difficult for discursive
beliefs to capture as richly or efficiently. This is understanding not that the
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goal or intention is this rather than that, but that it is a goal or intention
at all, as opposed to merely a likely future state of affairs which will make
some intermediate states of affairs more likely than others. The difference
can be illustrated with a clock. We can identify the future state towards which
a clock is set to run—e.g., it is set to display the same time as a particu-
lar satellite does 10 minutes from now. But that is not an intention of the
clock. We do not understand it as an intention and would not simulate the
movement of the clock’s second hand with our mirror neurons (unless, per-
haps, we were pretending the clock was a person, or that we were the clock).
Mirror neurons allow us to appreciate that the movement of another
person’s hand is an action, not just an unfolding sequence of states of the
world. They do this in virtue of the fact that they are redeployments of the
mechanism that we use when we act ourselves. It would be difficult to give a
discursive definition of what it is to act or to intend, as opposed to events just
happening, but with mirror neurons we do not have to use such a definition.
Whatever action and intention are in themselves we can recognize them by
reference to our own acts; acting is whatever it is I am doing when my
own motor neurons are firing and causing movement of my hand. Sinigaglia
(2013, 60) makes a similar point that “. . . [t]he mirror mechanism enables
the onlooker to understand the goal of the other’s action from the inside as
an outcome to which her own action can be directed and not just from the
outside as something that can happen, as a mere event among others”. It
allows one to appreciate of a goal or intention that it is a goal or intention.
Efficiency, Vulnerability, and Morality in Social Cognition
The continual emotion that is felt in the theatre excites us, enervates us,
enfeebles us, and makes us less able to resist our passions. And the sterile
interest taken in virtue serves only to satisfy our vanity without obliging us
to practice it.
— Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Politics and the Arts: Letter to M. D’Alembert
on the Theatre
In the justified excitement about mirror neurons and simulation of other
minds in general, there is too little discussion of the disadvantages of these
ways of knowing others’ minds.14 Obviously one dimension of trade-off is
between efficiency and accuracy. It seems that simulation in general and use
of mirror neurons in particular can be more efficient than conceptualizing
and theorizing in simple cases, insofar as it bypasses at least some reasoning
processes, thus lightening the computational load on the brain and making us
able to judge and respond faster. But of course some matters are complicated
and for those a slower and more laborious reasoning with propositions will
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have enough better accuracy to compensate for the computational cost and
loss of speed. So far this is merely the well known difference between thinking
fast and slow, but understanding by redeployment of one’s own system of
action-intention, sensation, or emotion introduces a new dimension of cost to
the observer, the cost of feeling or virtually doing what the other feels or does.
Redeploying one’s own pain neurons when observing someone else in
pain has the immediate cost of feeling bad, but the costs can also ramify.
One’s natural impulse in response to one’s own pain is to take steps to
alleviate it, but if it is caused by witnessing someone else’s pain one could
achieve this not only by alleviating the other’s pain, but also by moving far
enough away so as not to observe the other anymore; one could help or one
could flee, which may cause feelings of guilt later. Processing the other’s pain
as a fact to have beliefs about rather than re-experiencing it oneself would
make it possible to respond on the basis of ethical principles and avoid
sympathetic pain. If a nurse had an impulse to flee when re-experiencing
someone else’s pain that would be a reason not to simulate on the job (or
not to be a nurse), but equally if simulation prompted impulses to help,
delivery of the help would nevertheless be made less efficient by her wincing
at the patient’s pain.
Feeling another’s pain can also make one vulnerable to exploitation.
Suppose that you have a tendency to mirror another’s pain when you observe
it and a tendency to help rather than flee in response to it, and that your
decision whether to help is strongly influenced by the intensity of the pain
or need for help. Then someone who is good at faking the expression of
pain or neediness can exploit your tendencies and be more likely to gain
what they want. If instead of simulating you had evaluated the situation
entirely in the “pale, detached” medium of belief—representational attitudes
about propositions—you would observe the visible cues that the person is
feeling pain, but you would consider various other relevant matters as well,
such as whether there are other possible motives for the person to display
pain signs, and whether you have the spare resources to help. Even if the
good faker succeeded in getting you to believe they were in pain, these other
considerations would be weighed alongside, and that attributed pain would
also not give you the same degree of motivation to help that it would if it
were experienced as your own pain.
Redeployment of one’s own apparatus for feeling and doing when ob-
serving others feeling and doing may have moral costs as well. Rousseau
famously condemned theatre, arguing that an audience’s emotional iden-
tification with the characters in theatre was morally disastrous. This was,
roughly, because empathy has a natural role in our innate moral sense
motivating us to moral action, and the experience of it and its resolution
on stage gives an empathizing viewer the false sense that moral duty has
been discharged (Banerjee 1977). The intensity of the emotions identified
with in some drama might also dull one’s sensibilities by wearing them out.
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Jane Heal puts the point nicely when she explains what a simulation is by
imagining using one’s heart “offline” to predict what will happen to someone
else’s heartrate under various physical exertions: “All this sounds pretty risky.
Perhaps it would be better to carry around a spare heart to do the experi-
ments on” (Heal 1994, 134).
It is easier for an observer to distinguish virtual acting from his taking
real action than it is to distinguish virtual feeling from real feeling. Yet there is
an additional worry about actions, that identification with or re-experiencing
of another’s intentional actions can make similar action on one’s own part
more probable, and those actions may not always be good (Cf. Khalil 2011).
This could be expected if the experience of dancers is any guide. “Marking” is
imaginatively or with only token physical movements putting oneself through
the motions of a routine—not just imagining someone else do it. It is a
ubiquitous practice because without exhausting the muscles it succeeds in
training them to be more likely to carry out the routine correctly. When
mirror motor neurons are firing in observation they are either inhibited from
or not turned on for leading to action, by the firing or not of other neurons,
but the regulatory system must be more sophisticated than that if virtual
dance gets through to affect one’s future actual dance. Learning more about
how the switching system works will be important for evaluating the cost of
simulative ways of knowing.
Conclusion
I have argued on the basis of an independently plausible account of
what it is to understand why p is the case that theoretical mindreading and
simulation achieve understanding in virtue of the same feature, which is the
ownership of a set of states disposed to vary with the subject’s believing
p or not in the same way that states of the world relevant to p vary with
p’s truth value. I have used this concept of understanding to argue that the
fact that mirror neurons fire selectively in response to observed actions in
the same way that they fire when the subject so acts herself is sufficient for
the subject to have an understanding of why the actor’s hand moves as it
does. This understanding is achieved whether there is or is not a further
process that causes the network of dispositions to be activated selectively in
a particular case, and whether or not the subject has a further belief state
that is ascription of a goal, though having those additional nodes in his
network would increase or improve the subject’s understanding in a clear
way. I have further argued that the matching that mirror neurons do delivers
understanding of an intention that it is an intention in a simple and direct
way. Finally, I have suggested that the potential costs of social cognition by
the method of simulation, and the relation of those variables to how the
brain works, are worthy of further study.
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Notes
1. Note that to avoid clumsy terminology in what follows I am using the term
“mindreading” generally, for understanding another’s mind regardless of method,
and the qualifier “theoretical” when referring to that particular method.
2. Knowledge is defined by adding to Goldman’s view of justified belief a require-
ment that the belief actually be true, and a clause that rules out troublesome
Gettier cases.
3. An exception to this is described in footnote 13, but there too the reasoning
would be consciously accessible to the subject.
4. This is so even if higher-level interpretation is required in order for those mirror-
ing simulations to be delivered selectively depending on goals. (See Csibra 2013,
Jacob 2013.)
5. The conditional probabilities listed for the tracking conditions are shorthand for
a universal quantification over a set of probability functions that corresponds
to a set of possible situations; that is what makes the tracking conditions modal
and dispositional. How to define which situations among all possible situations
are the ones the subject is responsible for is a long-standing question which I
answer via further probabilistic conditions (Roush 2005, Ch. 3).
6. The tracking conditions are not strictly closed under known implication, leading
to the consequence that the level of tracking can fall off with each inference,
and eventually have the level of tracking in one’s conclusion belief fall below
the threshold. I address this in Roush (2012), where I show that under natural
conditions the tracking level falls off gradually with acceptable lower bounds, a
property I call “closure enough”.
7. For ease of exposition I formulate the conditions counterfactually rather than
probabilistically in this sentence though the distinction is quite important (Roush
2005, Ch. 3).
8. Externalist theories of knowledge are weaker than internalist in that they do
not require conscious access to reasons, but stronger along another dimension.
Typical internalist theories do not require for knowledge any reliable relation of
the subject’s belief to how the world is. The only relation the belief must have to
the world is being true.
9. There are other ways of measuring degree of probabilistic relevance. This measure
corresponds to the likelihood ratio, which I prefer on other grounds (Roush 2005,
Ch. 5), and which makes for a clear link between this view of understanding and
the tracking view of knowledge.
10. This tracking is achieved to a degree bounded from below by the level of matching
the si-b(p) relations have to the relations between the qi’s and p, and the level of
tracking that b(p) does of p, a property I call “transitivity enough”. See Roush
(2005, Chapter 5).
11. The force of my phrase “in one’s person” is to include the body and not just the
mind, and to require an intimate sense of ownership of the states that co-vary
with the world, but it is not intended to exclude a priori the possibility that the
mind extends beyond the skull to include cognitive aids in the environment (Clark
and Chalmers 1998). I say that a person does not achieve understanding of why
the temperature will be high merely by consulting a computer simulation’s output
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prediction that the temperature will be high, if he has no knowledge or sense
of the dimensions of the model the computer is using. The computer itself may
understand, since it does possess the dynamical model of the weather. And the
computer’s computation can be said to be part of the person’s cognitive process
for identifying the temperature, and so part of his extended mind. However to be
hooked up to the variation in the computer’s states that correspond to variable
dimensions in the world—i.e. to be hooked up to the computer’s understanding—
in such a way as to make use of it would ipso facto give one a dynamical
mirror model inside oneself, meaning that there would be no reason to say one’s
understanding was located in the mind’s extension rather than inside one’s skull.
Understanding may be a bit like taking a bath—something you have to do
yourself.
12. I myself think of beliefs as dispositions, but any view of belief is consistent with
the model I am describing because the question what beliefs are can be separated
from questions about the dispositions to have a belief or to have one belief when
one has another.
13. The fact that theoretical mindreading qualifies as a dynamical mirror model may
raise the worry that on my view implicit theory use collapses to simulation, since
the dynamical mirror model idea has a simulationist feel to it. This is ironic since
traditionally the worry has been how to define simulation in such a way as to
avoid its collapse to implicit theory (e.g., Heal 1994). However, theorizing remains
distinct on my view because it uses beliefs about the actor in its determination
of a conclusion about the actor, rather than the subject’s re-deploying her own
psychological mechanisms. The only case when this distinction would potentially
not apply is when the subject is trying to determine whether the actor believes
p given that the actor believes a set of premises q, r, and s. The most efficient
way to figure this out would not be to manipulate beliefs about the beliefs of
the actor, but to suppose that the actor is rational like you and to use your own
reason to infer from q, r, and s to p or not-p. In this case you are re-deploying
the equipment that you use to get beliefs like p and not-p, and thus count as
simulating, but I see nothing counter-intuitive about calling it that, and it does
not change the distinction present in other cases.
14. An exception is Khalil, who is concerned about how mirroring can lead to
contagion, whether the action mirrored is good or bad.
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